Hyperrealism as Metaphysics/Homage to Don Eddy

I have some attraction to the style of hyperrealism, that had its heyday in the 1970s and was championed by artists like Richard Estes, Ralph Goings or, for this respect, Don Eddy. You can see it as an epiphenomenon to pop art, or as an approach in technique (since the techniques behind attaining a hyperrealistic expression in painting are non-trivial), or as blatantly mindless and commercial. You can see it with reference to the Baudrillardian Simulacrum. Nevertheless you also seem to have some eerie metaphysics in it; and so you might regard hyperrealism as a form of the highest endeavour in art: of art trying to be “the true metaphysical activity” (as Nietzsche postulated it (with reference to Schopenhauer)).

Metaphysics in art means that art should reveal the “true”, “deeper” essence of a thing that is supposedly hidden beneath its surface, an essence that is both revealed and concealed by the surface and therefore reveals and conceals itself in interplay with the surface. In truly great art you therefore seem to have two worlds constantly shifting and shining through each other. The realm of the metaphysical is of another dimension. In the empirical world you are supposedly barred from directly gazing into the metaphysical, as you lack proper dimensionality. However higher dimensions will make themselves apparent via imprints and footprints in the empirical world, that are both revelatory and enigmatic alike. You therefore have to follow the footprints of the metaphysical and try to then deduce its entire structure; you will do so via speculation (in philosophy) or via apprehension (in art). The great artwork, where you have (at least) two worlds shining through each other, will evoke apprehension (Ahnung) in the viewer. Apprehension/Ahnung is the true mode of perception of the metaphysical, as expressed via the means of art.

Hyperrealism, as the term already implies, presents reality as a hyper-reality. Hyperreality, or making a thing go hyper, does not necessarily mean reaching into the metaphysical; in itself it just means blowing things up (or something similar to that). This alone, however, addresses the (metaphysical!) question, whether our understanding of “the metaphysical” is but a mere blow-up of our ordinary understanding and abilities (as an interpretation of the nature of metaphysics and religion in the tradition of Feuerbach would go), or something distinct to it. In the great artwork at least, you will have an evocation of the “inner reality” of the presented object, its “inner reality” will pour out of the object. In hyperrealism, objects beam and glow; you have that metaphysical glance pouring out of them. Of course, these are just mirror reflections of their lookalike surroundings on polished surfaces: indicating that they have no inner or original essence. They are derivative. Yet in their universally mirrored togetherness and assemblage they seem to create an own and autonomous sphere, governed by its own logic. It is the sphere of technology and industrial mass production and consumption. The metaphysical glance of the mass product you already had within pop art.

Hyperrealism seems to present a timeless, static, stainless and perfect world, a world that seems “metaphysical”. Like the Stillleben/still life, hyperrealism presents everyday and mundane objects. In the case of Don Eddy, it is mostly Volkswagens. Volkswagens are the product of a very sophisticated culture, they are unlike the fruits, dead animals and flowers presented in original still lives. They are the product of a very sophisticated technology. Therein, hyperrealism also bears resemblance to American precisionism of the 1920s, notably the “still lives” trying to capture the metaphysical aspects of industrial landscapes by Charles Sheeler. Technology, as Heidegger suggests, introduces a new Existenzial to human existence, and technology is also metaphysical and otherworldly. While technology is implicitly perfectly understood and mastered by man, the implications of technology cannot be; therefore technology confronts man with the Not-I, with the Other.

Also the traditional still lives confront man with the Not-I, with the Other. And they both confront man with persistence as well as transience and decay. The vegetables and flowers are prone to wither away, the dead animals are waiting to be consumed. Also the shiny Volkswagens will rust and become dysfunctional. You seem to have a dead or inanimate world in still lives and in hyperrealism. Therefore it confronts the viewer, who is alive, with death: which is something metaphysical. Which one is of superior order: the animate or the inanimate? That is a metaphysical question. You have a strange encounter of those orders in still lives and in hyperrealism: it translates into a metaphysical encounter. In the mundanity of its objects, something magical still seems to shimmer through. The magic of the existence of mundanity. Still lives, hyperrealism or the Pittura metafisica confront the viewer with the metaphysical character of pure presence. Pure presence does not speak and is not revelatory of itself. It evokes apprehension.

All metaphysics is strange. It is alienated, yet it is familiar as well. You feel connected to it and you can relate to it, but there is also a gap. The gap can only be grossed via the mind and via imagination. Although metaphysics is therefore only mildly strange, it never loses its strangeness and fascination, it is a dynamic strangeness that never becomes boring.

It is interesting though why we would usually think of the realm of the metaphysical as something static, silent and immovable. Why would the image of the metaphysical not be dynamic, even wild and chaotic, and loud? Since dynamics, chaos and sound are most obviously also principles that guide our existence. Maybe this is so because our dominant understanding of the metaphysical is still rooted in Plato´s concept of the realm of eternal ideas. Yet, apart from that, our natural aspirations seem to point in the respective direction. You like to think of the metaphysical realm as being primary, dominant, the unmoved mover, eternal. Overally, you will think of the metaphysical realm as something sublime. Therefore, as the counterpart to your nervous and ephemeral subjectivity, the metaphysical will appear as static and timeless, as a sublime objectivity. Of course, you have the expression of the metaphysical and of the sublime also in music, and music involves time. However, sacred music is usually static. And also for painting and sculpture, expression of the metaphysical is not at all necessarily static: It necessitates the two worlds constantly shining through each other, making up for something sublimely static as well as highly dynamic at once. While we may not know how the metaphysical realm actually looks like, the interaction between the empirical world and the metaphysical world is a constant fluctuation, a constant pulse. Within the pulse, the static and the dynamic become unified.

In the paintings of Don Eddy you usually will have presented a world soley made out of objects, absent from man or creature, or of any subjectivity. However, subjectivity you have in the usually very subjective angles that establish the perspective in his paintings. It is usually a narrow perspective, from which you see bits and pieces and fragments. And from what you can see, it is a narrow and packed world, it is confined. Despite the (odd) elegance of the Volkswagens, you do not seem to have an elegant world. Genius spiritualises everything, says Salvador Dali. In the actual works of Don Eddy you seem to have a de-spiritualisation of the sublime metaphysical realm, populated by Volkswagens, which are elegant but do not populate their realm in an elegant way.

That again raises big metaphysical questions. It might be that the metaphysical realm always will remain confined and restricted to our subjective viewpoint and therefore cannot fully be embraced by us, or so the story may go. However, like the Pittura metafisica of Giorgio de Chirico and his (surrealistic) followers it also seems to imply another, more uncanny interpretation: That the metaphysical realm itself is confined and unelegant. We would like to think of the realm of the metaphysical as something lofty and celestial, but actually the realm of the metaphysical might not be such a pleasant place to be. Like in the empirical world, there might be cruelty in it, and it might be intransparent and opaque to itself, it might be a battleground of conflicting forces or even a warzone. It might actually be quite mindless (and therefore silent, because it is too stupid to speak and elaborate on itself). Enter the metaphysics of H. P. Lovecraft and of the Necronomicon (although I would not like to go that far, but this might only be due to my optimistic personality).

Understanding these possibilities at any rate elevates the human mind. And therein, art “is the true metaphysical activity”. Over the course of time Don Eddy shifted away from capturing the metaphysical via Volkswagens or industrial landscapes; he often paints triptychs that show unrelated yet somehow ethereal images of the sea, of the sky, of plants or of ancient architecture. Of course, the metaphysical perpection cannot be a perception of the “whole”. It might likewise be the perception of distinct units of the whole simultaneously, suggesting that unification between these distinct units will be done by the mind, or the metaphysical ether – out there as well as within you – that puts all of this together. Thank you, Don Eddy; thank you, Hyperrealists.

The Formula that Would Have Saved Wittgenstein

The formula that translates the ideal world into the empirical world – that whereof one must be silent, if thereof one cannot speak – is

🥰🤪🥳 = N—°÷^|UU__¢√π§∆[Z°°¥`™ x GMm(1/(r + d)^2 + 8 – 666

(That is to say they are interconnected and shift through each other anyway.) Knowing about the formula should make you more advanced than Wittgenstein, also happier. You should not have all too firm attachments to neither world and neither thing at any rate, nor to yourself. What is important is to know the algorithm that attaches the things. Then you cannot be marooned due to the final inaccessability of the Not-I. It is the formula of the Unitary Consciousness.

Dedicated to the memory of Franz Fischer

Kubrick vs Tarkovsky: A Space Odyssee

The art and literary genius is a melancholic regarding existence and the human realm, which will appear to him as unrealised potential, and he will be compassionate. Stanley Kubrick nevertheless strikes as a bit too sober in his respective melancholy and on the verge of being cynical. He usually portrays how characters get squashed by institutions. Kubrick most commonly debases humanity, portraying human weaknesses rather than human strengths and he rarely portrays how humans may rise above institutions. Art however should teach the overman. The Space Odyssee actually teaches the overman, yet in the Space Odyssee the advent of the overman remains vague and unintelligible, and actually resemblant to a technical trick or to some kind of slapstick in storytelling.

Tarkovsky, the greatest of filmmakers, teaches the overman via the need for the sacrifice. Via the borderline-irrational ethical act of the sacrifice the individual debases itself and its individuality, but he will fully realise his existence as a social being. In becoming a true social being, he will become universal. He will therefore regain an individuality that is both subjective and universal. The common stages of human psychological integration are the fragmented/neurotic ego; the ego; and the self. These stages progressively integrate more and more stuff into the individual monad, which therefore becomes progressively competent and successfully manages to both become an individual as well as a social being. Where it gets really interesting is when we progress to stages that are even beyond and higher than the integration level of the self. The self means an ego that has integrated wider parts of the world and has become truly sentient and knowing. It equals the “spiritual” experience, i.e. that of a meaningful ego in a meaningful wider world. The spiritual experience is diffuse, however. Beyond the self there will appear on the horizon the religious experiences (in the wider sense of the word). Religious experiences will be more profound than mere spiritual experiences and you will ultimately approach the deep laws that govern existence, and you will become mimetic to them. Beyond the integration level of the self, there begins the level of transcendent man and of the superhuman; deeper down the spiral stuff and understanding of stuff get more “mystic” from the common perspective, yet more lucid, and meaningful, when you are on that plane yourself. You will understand the meaning of life, and you will understand the meaning of death. Therein, stages beyond the integration level of the self will become eschatological. And as a metaphysical enterprise art should also be eschatological (which Kubrick´s films most commonly aren´t, and Tarkovsky´s most commonly are). The overman is the meaning of the Earth, thus speaks Zarathustra. And so, in order to be truly meaningful, art should teach the overman.

The aliens respectively the black monoliths in the Space Odyssee might symbolise God, or a deus ex machina from higher entities. They might also symbolise though the unconscious and opaque parts of man´s progressively developing consciousness and a “dialectics of enlightenment”. They might symbolise that consciousness and intelligence, and the purpose of consciousness and intelligence, will remain enigmatic seemingly forever (which is the overall theme in the science fiction literature of Stanislaw Lem). In the Nietzschean vision the overman relates to the idea that nothing will remain enigmatic and foreign to the overman, respectively that no powers and influences outside of him will have power and influence over him. The overman will be in full possession of himself. “God is dead”, there is no law outside of man, and the overman will establish his own laws. Because of this, and because of this egoic concept, the Nietzschean overman remains puzzling and seemingly shaky. Devoid of his nature as a social being, the Nietzschean overman resembles the most private of man, and, therein, an idiot. The Nietzschean overman is unstable, therefore the Nietzschean pathos of “tragedy” inherent to the story of the overman. On the unhealthy side of his personality, Nietzsche was a paranoid neurotic, therefore he had an exaggerated, delusional desire for “total liberation” and unhindered exercise of his “will to power” over everyone and everything else. Yet the overman will be a finite being nevertheless, and therefore will be subject to laws. In abolishing God, in abolishing compassion, in stripping off man from his dual nature as both being a social being as well as an individual in favor of the latter, the Nietzschean overman will not have insight into the laws that govern existence and therefore he will be unstable. He cannot integrate the laws that govern existence into himself in a meaningful way and apply them from a meta level, he will be god-forsaken, and therein will be bound to a neurotic “eternal recurrence of the same” (which is resemblant to the Freudian death drive). Nietzsche did not want to make sacrifices, he would rather sacrifice others to reach the stage of the overman. Yet Tarkovsky (and Schopenhauer) teach us the overman via teaching us the sacrifice. You integrate the dual nature of both being an individual as well as a social being by stepping out both from the logics of individuality and of social rationality, via the borderline-irrational ethical act of the sacrifice.

While Tarkovsky apparently understood this, I doubt that Stanley Kubrick would have understood anything about this. Of course, Stanley Kubrick was a man of great curiosity and intellectual and aesthetic passion. Yet there is little indication that the idea of the overman, and especially the idea of the overman being grounded on the sacrifice, would have been more than an intellectual delicacy to him. They say that intellectual curiosity is a good thing, as curiosity for things is somehow equivalent to sympathy and sensibility towards people (or animals). Yet that is doubtful. Stanley Kubrick´s art is the expression of a seemingly endless curiosity, but it is largely inhuman. In Kubrick´s films the environments and settings usually are fascinating and sophisticated, but they curiously barely relate to the characters. They are alien and indifferent, or even hostile to them. In the films of Tarkovsky or Antonioni, who were the great masters of environment in cinema, the environments and settings relate to the characters in one way or the other, the individuals are embedded in them, even if they are most obviously disembedded from them. Also in Kubrick films music seems to primarily be a delicacy for the director, and also for the audience. Tarkovsky´s use of the music of Bach seems more understanding, and not a mere surface phenomenon. It is also Tarkovsky who said that ultimate geniuses like Bach or Leonardo (who are resemblant to the overman) had a view on humanity and on existence as if an alien would view humanity and existence, and permanently tries to come to terms with it in its bewilderment. The Space Odyssee at least fails to truly do this. It´s a nice try though.

Note that for the sake of demonstration we are dealing here with idealised opposites. In reality Stanley might have been a cool and funny guy to hang around with, whereas Andrei might have been stern and forbidding.

Nietzsche and Marx

Most philosophers seem to be neurotic. While they usually start with an enterprise that appears entirely rational and logical, they time and again end up with something bizarre; their original rational propositional content driven to extremes that deem exaggerated and irrational and that defy common sense. (Of course there are intellectuals that are derisive of the common sense all the same and consider “common sense” as a primitive tool for ordinary people and for the hoi polloi against whom they think they are at war with anyway. Yet they should look out that the joke isn´t on them in the end.) Maybe these philosophers fall in love too much with their own concepts so that they want to see them everywhere and therefore expand them until they get overstretched. Yet maybe their philosophies are an epiphenomenon of their psychologies in the first place, and psychologies frequently are exaggerated, irrational and neurotic. (Actually Nietzsche was the first philosopher to try to track down philosophies and religious doctrines (and even science) to the psychologies – and the irrationalities of the psychologies – of their respective founders. Marx would do something similar in tying philosophies etc. to class consciousness. And, in a way, their debasement of rational thought as more or less an epiphenomenon of an irrational psychology or social position – though intuitive in the first place – seems exaggerated and bizarre and hard to swallow once again.)

Both Nietzsche and Marx are great liberators. They want to free man from oppression, emancipate man and maximise his freedom. That is basically a good and a healthy idea and strikes as a noble cause. Yet at least deeper down inside, both Nietzsche and Marx are very aggressive personalities. They indeed want total liberation and freedom for man, which is irrational (and politically dangerous). They do so because they are paranoid neurotics. Both Marx and Nietzsche are permanently feeling oppressed, besieged, subdued, exploited, they both regard life as a permanent struggle and they see themselves – against their will – integrated into a mere power dynamics that makes up for the human and social fabric in their imagination (whereas Nietzsche felt threatened by groups that form a lower social stratum, Marx felt threatened by groups that form a higher social stratum). When you feel that oppressed, a “revolution” and “total liberation” will appear as the natural antidote. In their all-or-nothing worldview it´s “Victory or Die”. They do not compromise. Because of their uncompromising nature and their maximalist philosophies both Marx and Nietzsche exercise great charisma as iconoclasts and they are captivating to the adventurous-hearted among us. But, whilst being great iconoclasts, how good are they as architects?

Both Nietzsche and Marx obviously had uncomfortable inner lives. They both experienced existence as something painful. Nietzsche considered this inherent to being itself and did not want to change that; he actually considered heightened sensitivity to pain and Weltschmerz as something aristocratic and elite. Via the overman Nietzsche wanted to conceptualise a state of inner freedom that triumphs over the impertinences being imposes on man, and via the Amor fati he wanted to establish a positive force that is greater and more powerful than the negative forces that derive from the outside, as a sort of “in your face” against their impertinence. Marx, by contrast, thought that pain is imposed on man by economic backwardness, by class society and by lack of knowledge/”false consciousness”, i.e. conditions that could be changed via socialist revolution. Both Nietzsche´s concept of the overman and Marx` concept of the revolution are highly energetic and, therein, captivating. Nietzsche wanted to impose pain and hardship on the lower classes whom, for some obscure reasons, he hated and feared – although he did not want to eradicate them. Marx wanted to impose pain and hardship on the upper classes which he hated and feared – and actually eradicate them: though in the dialectic manner of his thinking he wanted the upper classes and their negative, the lower classes, to conclude to a synthesis of a classless man, who will not only overcome the open pain of the lower classes but also the secret pain and despair that haunts the upper classes in a class society. In the classless society of socialism existence would become free from pain.

Also Marx` classless man of the socialist future strikes as some kind of overman. When limitations from the outside are removed, or so Marx thought, man could live up to full universal human potential. Time and again, Marx suggests that in socialism/communism classless man will live a Leonardo da Vinci-like existence of a Renaissance man and of a uomo universalis. Fully developed “productive forces” will do the dirty work, the division of labour will become obsolete (for reasons largely untold by Marx and Engels), and man will “own” his labour and the fruits from his labour himself. Labour will cease to be a necessity and will become some kind of artistic self-realisation of man (or, as you might equally think, some kind of wellness therapy that saves him from boredom). However, also the socialist man envisaged by Marx remains somehow strangely passive when compared to the vision of Nietzsche, who always was speaking about “creation” instead of “labour” when it came to the original mode of the self-realisation of man. Marx` socialist man is actually quite a domesticated man, while Nietzsche always advocated living “dangerously”, adventurously, creatively and outside of society. While Marx wants to remove the forces that restrict the freedom of man from the outside, he never became very vocal or imaginative about the inner freedom of man. What deems paradoxical about Marx and most Marxists is that they do not seem to strive for true inner freedom and emancipation in the first place: because they do not want to be free from Marxism. Marxism is a doctrine, moreover a doctrine largely based on hostility and, as Nietzsche would identify it, on ressentiment; Marxists usually want to be the good ones and some selected other groups to be the evil ones; they do not want to be beyond good and evil, i.e. achieve true inner freedom, because they do not want to free from society and they do not want to free from Marxism. They want to stick to them. Therefore they stick to their attachments and remain entangled in Samsara and its affairs. To combine a struggle for the outer freedom of man with the struggle for the inner freedom of man is where it would get very interesting (and this will be my turn). While Marx wanted to bring a noble society, Nietzsche wanted to bring a noble individual. So they may complement each other – and so they may intrinsically differ from each other. Yet both socialism and the overman are metaphysical constructs at any rate. They are beyond anything mankind has ever experienced. While metaphysics has rationality, we ultimately do not know whether metaphysical postulates are but mere fantasy.

Whereas Marx at times is not even considered a full-blown philosopher because he was overly preoccupied with politics, Nietzsche wanted to refrain from all politics and he took pride in considering himself “den letzten unpolitischen Deutschen”. Nevertheless he also had his views about how a society should be organised, and as he definitely wanted to be segregated from the lower classes he advocated some kind of caste system; at least he was a political reactionary and he staunchly resisted socialism. Yet Nietzsche, first and foremost, seemed too egoic and self-obsessed to apparently even being able to develop a concept and an understanding of what a society actually is and what politics actually is. In a way, Nietzsche remained “politically naïve”. Marx, by contrast, was super political, to a degree that his understanding of politics morphed into the philosophical and metaphysical. The forces that determine politics in his view – “dialectical materialism”, “class struggle”, “revolution”, “socialism” – are on the verge of being deeply ontological ideas, if not metaphysical and eschatological ones. Nietzsche wanted to free himself from obstructive outside influences. He had a considerably feminine, “compassionate” personality, and he longed for “masculine” dominance, resilience and strength. In a way, Nietzsche´s life struggle was to liberate himself from the influence of his gently possessive mother, and he described this struggle for self-realisation with great and captivating pathos. Therefore Nietzsche is appealing to so many people (with the exception of most Marxists however), because self-realisation is a universal topic. Marx, by contrast, was estranged from his mother. He knew that in part he was himself to blame for this, due to his thorny and detrimental egoism and his exploitative and dominating habitus he already demonstrated as a child (characteristics he would later attribute with great and captivating pathos to capitalism). The theme of his life was “alienation” and reconciliation. His vision is to reconcile man with society, end all conflict and alienation and end all egoism by letting the individual labour of man become literally symbiotic with the labour of society. Socialism, as Marx literally had envisaged it, bears similarities to a protective and nurturing womb, in which the embryo can “progress” and develop freely. While there are rationally justifiable hopes that socialism would make a better economy and society, Marx went beyond that in his vision and hopes for socialism and became quite irrational. Psychologically, his strive for socialism may be interpreted as an attempt for reconciliation with his “mother” (though in an actually archaic and regressive way), respectively with his own suppressed emotionality to finally become a fully realised “ganzer Mensch”. Both Nietzsche and Marx actually were overmen due to their very superior intellect – and they also were barred from being overmen because their emotional lives were in disarray. Hence their laborious and pathos-ridden struggle for liberation, for the overman or for socialism strikes as an expression of their fundamental phantasma.

Both Nietzsche and Marx seem to be concerned with the issue of value. They want to create new values and want to stretch the human experience to where it had never been before. Nietzsche considers it the task of the philosopher to evaluate existence and to attribute value to things. Nietzsche does this out of an aristocratic understanding and self-concept, whereas Marx despises the aristocracy (although there are indications that he secretly admired the aristocracy). At any rate they are both confronted with the problem of establishing an intrinsic value. Nietzsche wants to do this via the overman as the elevated instance that attributes value to everything else. Marx sees the abstract labour of the worker as the source of all value. Yet value hardly is intrinsic. A value is both substantial as well as relational: it refers to a quality that needs to be there, but that also needs to be considered as “valuable” from someone else. Both Marx and Nietzsche most obviously had an inferiority complex. Out of that sprang their desire to feel superior to others, their quick irritation when someone else had power, and their hunger to demonstrate to themselves that they had “intrinsic” value, independent from anyone else´s judgement. Yet the only thing that may have intrinsic value is God in heaven. Both Marx and Nietzsche wanted to do away with God and become some kind of God in heaven themselves.

Nietzsche was dismissive of a popular philosopher of his time whose name I forgot. He considered him flat and unoriginal. When Nietzsche became popular the respective philosopher took revenge and considered Nietzsche as flat and unoriginal and as a plagiarizer of Max Stirner, who, in his work Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (The Ego and Its Own) advocated the self-realisation of the individual (how egoistic it ever may be) as the sole purpose of life. He rejected the idea of man as a social being and became a forerunner of individualist philosophy and, politically, of anarchism. Therefore there is some resemblance to Nietzsche (although Nietzsche´s body of work was much more comprehensive and his writing style far superior to Stirner´s). We do not know whether Nietzsche had read Stirner, but Marx certainly had and he criticized Stirner´s egoic philosophy to an extend that it seemed to have been obsessive. The difference between Nietzsche and Stirner however is that while Stirner wanted to realise the full potential of the ego, of man, Nietzsche wanted to overcome the ego, overcome man and reach out into an entirely different kind of man, a different kind of subject: the overman, as a transcendental to man. Marx, by contrast, struck hard against Stirner because Stirner negated the social existence of man and wasn´t a “socialist”, although also Stirner´s ideas lie along the general trajectory of enlightenment, liberation and progress (whilst, within the “dialectics of enlightenment”, Stirner´s contribution was also some kind of “dark enlightenment”). Like Marx, also Stirner departed from Hegel, and like Stirner, also Marx was (in some way) a philosopher of anarchism and of the abolition of the state. Yet, if you take a closer look, Marx´ obsession with Stirner may have been grounded in that there may have been an intimacy between them deeper down inside. If you take a closer look at Marx´ vision of socialism you find astonishingly little about a society and an economy. What you have is an individual that has become omnipotent, that is in full possession of his skills, of the products of his labour, who via fully developed productive forces controls the world and the economy and who via the socialist plan even kind of controls destiny. He has become some kind of God in heaven, who can be assured to have his intrinsic value. On a more profane level, the vision of Marx about socialism seems to be similar to the vision of Stirner: what Marx describes as the socialist man appears to be, deeper down inside, a full imaginary realisation of the personality of Marx who gets reconciled with his suppressed emotionality and with the aspects of his personality he does not yet control and “own”, appears to be “der Einzige und sein Eigentum”.

Update About Marxism

Here´s a woman (on Facebook) trying to push us to read Marx` “Capital”. Once again, the vivid comment section is virtually all male; there are practically no women engaging in the discussion. What can be held credit to Marxism at least, is that it provokes discussion that can become quite sophisticated at times (though it does not do so among women).

As one guy in the comment section notes, it is actually not that clear how “dialectical” Marxism actually is, I have actually never understood the whole fuss Marxism makes about dialectics, and I have not truly witnessed Marxists thinking dialectically or in a truly critical fashion. Their “dialectics” rather seems an intellectual template to justify a reasoning and an outcome they were already advocating in advance and trying to solidify it. What is even more, they appear to like dialectics because they consider themselves as the oppressed, the excluded, i.e. the antithesis and the negative; and dialectics seems to ensure them that they will have their “revenge” over the oppressors, and that makes them feel good. At any rate, dialectical thinking is actually a somehow simplified thinking, giving the complexities that arise within the empirical world. Maybe you should not be too proud of yourself when you are just able to think dialectically. That is not a very elevated state of mind.

The greatness of Marxism and of “Capital” – and the attribute of all great works – is that it establishes a thinking and pushes it to the limits. It opens up a space and colonialises it entirely. Therefore it seems to be both universal and it seems to make you able to “see beyond the horizon”. “Capital” is insightful in many ways – and it also is convoluted and irritating in many ways. The fatal flaw within “Capital” is that it does not truly acknowledge that the interplay of economic factors can go into various directions and push an economy into various directions, often in an unpredictable (i.e. “undialectical”) manner (this also accounts for societies in general on which Marxism has an equally flat perspective). Though Marx was somehow aware of this in “Capital”, he nevertheless favours a fatalistic perspective on capitalism as being constitutive of a world inherently coming down.

Indeed, Marxist dialectics all too often appears as something rather mechanical than dialectical. And dialectics is not the only intellectual heuristics Marx` reasoning in “Capital” was based upon. He was actually also thinking within a deterministic and mechanical framework in the tradition of Descartes and Newton. (And, as an admirer of Charles Darwin, Marx flattered himself with coming up with an “evolutionary” theory of societies and economies – although we do not know how serious he actually meant that; Darwin at least reportedly considered the application of this evolutionary biology upon the study of societies as a non-starter (bourgeois economist and Marx critic Joseph Schumpeter would later praise Marx for establishing an evolutionary and historic perspective within economics however).) Today, Marxists (and others) like to ridicule mainstream economists for trying to do economics as a sort of physics. Yet it was Marx who actually had the same thing in mind.

Economies and societies are considered too “complex” and “dialectical” to be studied in the fashion of physical systems (although physical systems frequently and usually get that complex and dialectical all alike). Yet the main reason why sociology and economics cannot be done in the style of physics is that nature is based on symmetries and conservation laws, i.e. that certain properties like energy, momentum or electric charge must remain constant. From the conservation laws you can generate functions that describe developments and interactions of physical objects. Yet in neither societies nor economies you do have conservation laws and respective properties. Whilst in economics you have identities (like “spending = revenues” or “savings = investment”), but these are mirrored identities that appear within economic accounting, and nothing that equates to conservation laws. Therefore, economics and sociology can never be done in the fashion of physics. Note also that many phenomena in the domain of physics yet cannot be (effectively) computed and will probably remain beyond the scope of any mathematical calculus indefinitely.

The main concepts within “Capital”, the labour theory of value and the theory of surplus value, are opaque, and their true validity will probably remain undecidable forever. There are consistent solutions to the transformation problem and despite the intellectual irritations and philosophical problems it causes, the labour theory of value can be translated into a consistent logical and mathematical form and be made operational. Logical consistency however does not mean that something is empirically true or applicable. Also mainstream economics is logically consistent and its concepts can be made operational (to certain extends).

Marginalism, on which mainstream (or “bourgeois”) economics is based upon, appears more intuitive than the labour theory of value though. Yet it faces limitations alike, it establishes a paradigm that is equally grandiose and boastful in its ambitions as is Marxism, and its basic concept of “utility” is actually no less “metaphysical” than is “value”. While mainstream economics emphasizes consumption and (the beauty) of exchange, Marxism emphasizes (the ugliness and beauty) of production. While mainstream economics looks upon capitalism as something basically harmonious and functional, Marxism views capitalism as something basically conflictual and crisis-prone (Keynesianism somehow is a mixture of both, it regards capitalism as something unstable, but it is a consumption-based theory).

Both mainstream and Marxist economics (and Keynesianism) are epistemologies. They can be integrated into each other to a certain extent, but at the deep level they will remain conflicting. Their status yet remains undecidable, as we still do not know whether capitalism ontologically is basically something harmonious, or disharmonious. We do not know whether capitalism is cosmos or chaos, whether it refers to the metaphysics of Parmenides or the metaphysics of Heraclitus (naturally it will refer to both, which is why I like to introduce the metaphysics of the chaosmos).

More generally, societies, when regarded as something “harmonious”, can be viewed upon the epistemology of structural functionalism. Marxism, in a way, establishes a seeming contrast, or a “dialectical opposite”, of a “structural dysfunctionialism”. Yet they are both systematic approaches, and they ontologically regard societies (and economies) as “systems”. Yet maybe, in broader terms, societies and economies aren´t “systems”. Whilst they may be systems, they may nevertheless change, transform or undergo metamorphoses that make them become actually unrecognisable to what they had been before. Maybe we should try thinking about stuff beyond the conceptual scope of systems. This seems difficult, and maybe cannot even be done within science or philosophy. It may be the domain of artists, writers and of the literary genius (the Deleuze-guattarian philosophy of the rhizome, as something that goes beyond the notion of a system, is to a good deal literature).

(Funny enough, it is sometimes suggested to view the work of bold and super systematic (and unintelligible) philosopher Hegel and its predictions about the “end of history” not as actual philosophy, but as – literature. Equally, the charisma of Marxism and of “Capital” that forever remains, despite all its shortcomings, may be that it is a strong and essential, a necessary piece of “literature” about class-based societies and economies. As such, it is likely to remain as long as class-based societies and economies remain – and should class-based societies actually go away one day, the glory of Marx will be even greater, as that of the original prophet. Marx was, last not least, a literary genius and a stylist.)

A dual and conflicting aspect of Marxism is that it is both undogmatic, specific and related to specific problems and problem areas, yet also tries to be universal, doctrinaire, and wildly imaginative and speculative. Whilst Marx often was working on specific problems and specific societies in specific historic situations, it might be attributed to Engels to actually having established “Marxism” as a universal ideology with a missionary zeal in the “Anti-Dühring” (which, nevertheless, had the full approval of Marx). As the latter, it might have become intellectually, rationally, empirically falsified, but it will continue to haunt the imagination. As the former, when applied properly, it will remain valid all alike.

Mainstream economics (at least Lucas/DSGE-based macroeconomics) somehow accepts that it cannot get a grasp on the entire economic reality, and in a way, it does not even try to. It considers it the best way to look at an economy in a highly idealised way and to construct models that are internally consistent and are based on a conceptual apparatus (whilst DSGE-based macroeconomics is based on the conceptual apparatus introduced by Léon Walras, Keynesianism is based on the conceptual apparatus introduced by Alfred Marshall; whereas Marxist economics has its own conceptual apparatus). This lack of realism and neglect concerning the external consistency of their models frequently gets mainstream economists ridiculed from the outside. However, the many debates about the internal consistency of their theories and approaches, and their permanent confusion of taking internal consistency for external consistency all too easily, has been quite prevalent within the Marxist spectrum alike. It might be that mainstream economics has become less dogmatic and more diverse more recently though, especially in the aftermath of the world financial crisis of 2008. At any rate, it is quite difficult, if not impossible, to construct a perfectly externally consistent model when what you are studying is actually not a system. Therefore it seems more applicable to employ internally consistent models to get a grasp on at least some phenomena and parts of reality.

In an important way, it is particularly the left-wingers who always talk and complain about “the system”. The “system” clearly is an intellectual and emotional fetish they employ. Whilst there are systems in this world (and actually countless systems), I encourage to think beyond the concept of systems. “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro´ narrow chinks of his cavern”, says William Blake/Jim Morrison. Of course, with infinity you cannot make models and they cannot be computed. Yet when the doors of perception are cleansed, you sense that systems are relative. Maybe we need a theory of relativity for the social realm (which may bear some resemblance to a dialectical approach, but is something different).

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