Richard Rorty defines an „ironist“ as someone who doubts that the „vocabulary“ (i.e. set of beliefs, explanations, justifications, models, „philosophies“, etc.) she currently uses can be an ultimate vocabulary, immune to change, subversion or revolution. The ironist is aware of the contingent character of all vocabularies and of the contingency that she happens to use a specific vocabulary at a given moment, i.e. the ironist knows that any vocabulary is frickle. I call people of this sort „ironists“ because their realization that anything can be made to look good or bad can be redescribed, and their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between final vocabularies, puts them in the position which Sartre calls „meta-stable“: never quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves. (p.73f.)
Richard Rorty also says: the truth about the world is that there is no ultimate and fixed, final truth in it – there is only contingency (an apparently self-contradictory claim, yet, given the possibility that it is true, it is not (under such a circumstance, it cannot be made otherwise)). From such a perspective, irony seems the adequate adaption of the subject to such an objectivity. This is, then, the „meta-stability“, as the only possible stability in an, at best, meta-stable world.
On the other hand, there are the „metaphysicians“: some folks who think there is an ultimate „truth“ „out there“ and want to discover it. In this sense, the metaphysician is someone who takes the question „What it the intrinsic nature of (something)“ at face value. He assumes that the presence of a term in his own final vocabulary ensures that it refers to something which has a real essence. The metaphysician is still attached to the common senseetc. (p.74) In so far as the contigent nature of existence and the absence of ultimate, fixed truths is something that Rorty, with an aggressive irony, defends, the metaphysician appears as an odd fellow and a backward creature in the (final) vocabulary of Rorty. The ironist, by contrast, is little else than Rorty`s self-describtion.
Now take a look at me: apart from maybe Diogenes (who, however, was a cynic) there seem to be no musings in philosophy that embrace irony more than mine. Ironically, this is so because I am a very sincere metaphysician. I strive to get to know truth, I strive for better explanations than those that currently exist. I do not have many ideological inclinations, desires or a will to power about how this truth should be, in the truth being so and so and having this or that quality. But I am very interested in what the truth is (a type of subjectivity and a subjective zeal that, according to Rorty, cannot even exist. He, however, permanently fails to explain in a satisfactory way, why). Yet, as it seems, because I am such a commited metaphysician, I know what a tricky thing metaphysics or a quest for ultimate truth is. Because of this, I am naturally an ironist. Metaphysical truths are, practically by definition, truths we cannot finally be sure about. So I try to erect plateaus over the abyss. But even though they may appear as such at first glance, they are not meant to be some clownish contigencies! They are meant to (fundamentally) be true, and their intention is metaphysical.
So we need to reflect on this, and on what Rorty comes up with.
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Irony is a virtue of the subject. It is maybe the virtue of the most sophisticated of subjects. The world, in its cruel contingencies and iron laws, is not ironic. Irony is a clever adaption to them cruel contingencies and iron laws. With irony, the subject can distance itself from them cruel contingencies and iron laws, and even gain some superiority over them. Irony gives you inner freedom. Inner, subjective freedom, ultimately, may be the more profound freedom than objective freedom. As illustrated e.g. in Orwell´s 1984, sadistic torturers and totalitarian regimes do not only want to take your political freedom, they want to destroy your inner freedom. This is when they have achieved to finally break you. Socrates could not be broken. Not only the massive objectivity of the state and its tribunals, but even the value of life and death itself evaporated under his profound ironic stance – and so, in considerable terms, he triumphed over any of these massive objectivities and put them to shame.
Both Kierkegaard, in his magisterial thesis about Socrates and Irony, and Rorty note the massive negativity that lies in irony – a negativity that, however, liberates, as it dissolves the impositions and impertinences of fake positivities inflicted on the subject. Rorty even writes: Irony is, if not intrinsically resentful, at least reactive. Ironists have to have something to have doubts about, something from which to be alienated. (p.88) Also Kierkegaard eventually remains doubtful about irony as the highest elevation of subjectivity, the crown of subjectivity. To him, the highest elevation of subjectivity is when the subject becomes „transparent (in God)“. An ironic subject is not necessarily transparent; irony actually also obfuscates. We will touch upon that later.
However, I have doubts about Rorty´s negative stance on irony. Irony, if it is healthy at least, is neither that reactive, nor that doubtful. It is much more primary. If you are the cognitive type of a mismatcher, your „irony“ is primordial. If you think twice, there is no actual reason why an ironic mind should not be positive, constructive and very affirmative (and if, in the big picture, you want to adequately sort out what is cause and effect, action and reaction, you might run into a complicated chicken or the egg problematic anyway).
(On this occasion, since the „ironist“ is but a self-description (or self-idealisation) of Rorty, it may come to mind that Rorty with his specifically as such outlined at least reactive, if not intrinsically resentful irony actually may have been an unhealthy ironist, borderlining a cynic. His staunch disapproval of „metaphysics“ and „absolute truths“ (maybe in reaction against the arrogance within US academic philosophy at his time and where he was not particularly appreciated) may appear as being borne out of or gradually transformed into a cynic impulse, as something partially neurotic. Also, contrary to Rorty´s affirmation of permanent redescription and reinvention of vocabularies, Rorty´s vocabulary always stayed the same.)
As Slavoj Zizek illuminatingly notes, an ironic person takes the things actually more serious than she pretends to do. Them things may be nearer and dearer to her than it seems and may concern her more than it seems. Actually, they may truly concern her. The ironist is not indifferent. Irony is not the same as sarcsasm or cynicism. In sarcasm you have despair. The cynic despises. It may be just the ironist who appreciates, who is the positive lover of things. The ironist likely appreciates things or would like to appreciate them if they were not insufficient and inadequate, and even more likely, the ironist is aware of her own insufficiency and inadequancy. Irony therefore is also a consciousness about one´s own inadequancy and of the inadequancy of everything. It is a (happy) melancholic consciousness. Rorty was said to have been a melancholic (according to Aristotle, every thinker is).
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Therefore the ironist most likely will be a liberal. Liberal democracy appears as the natural political habitat of the competent, autonomous subject that is nevertheless attached to and interested in others i.e. that has itself included in society, that is a social being. Like anyone else the ironist wants to spread her own culture and live in a cultural environment that aligns to her own values. The ironist wants people to grow and prosper and to become competent enough to be able to stand for themselves (the cynic does not believe in such a possibility). Socrates, the master ironist, considered his interactions with people as midwifery and obstetrics: help them to grow their own autonomous and virtuous intellect. Therefore the ironist will prefer the system of a secular liberal democracy.
Richard Rorty is a staunch advocate of liberal democracy. To Rorty, liberal democracy and the furthering of liberal democracy is the ultimate goal of human existence (and even more important than the preservation of philosophy). He even flat out denies that philosophy can be of much help in shaping political communities and discourse. (To him, societies are not bound together by philosophical concepts but by vocabularies. This is of course true against chauvinist notions philosophers may hold (I can´t think however of any serious philosopher who did so), but is dismissive about philosophy being a vital part of (political) vocabularies.) Also his favorite attitude, that of the ironist, is eventually not meant to be political: I cannot imagine a culture which socialized its youth in such a way as to make them continually dubious about their own process of socialisation. Irony seems inherently a private matter. (p.87) (The ironist) cannot offer the same sort of social hope as metaphysicians offer. (p.91) The metaphysician, in short, thinks that there is a connection between redescription and power, and that the right redescription can make us free. The ironist offers no similar assurance. (p.90)
Therefore, irony to Rorty primarily is a matter of individual refinement, not a means to construct and solidify political communities: he is, again, dismissive of such possibilities. (Despite the rationality of this notion and Rorty´s positive reflections on the apparent connections between irony and liberalism again you seem to have some strange cynical depreciation by Rorty against what he is actually doing.) To Rorty, an ironist also is not necessarily a liberal. Liberals to Rorty are people for whom (to use Judith Shklar´s definition) „cruelty is the worst thing they do“ (p.74) Rorty abhorrs cruelty (among humans). That seems to add up. Cruelty may nevertheless be ironised by the ironist (a sophisticated ironist may find interesting solutions of how to be ironic even about cruelty – respectively for ironists from another culture being ironic about cruelty might just be the most natural of things). Yet both the ironist and the liberal will have a „live and let live (and let everything prosper)“ attitude. In order to ensure (decent) living, cruelty needs to be restrained. (Q.E.D.)
(Nietzsche was an ironist and, on the healthy side of his personality (Zarathustra), a staunch anti-authoritarian liberal. Yet on the unhealthy (cynical) side he was some sort of fascist or an advocate of a highly stratified, caste-like society. In his paranoid emotionality, Nietzsche was permanently concerned that „the weak“, the decadends, christians, socialists, the lower classes etc. would like to weaken him and inflict cruelty on him. And he wanted to be sheltered. Paranoia is usually a projection of one´s own aggression into others and into the environment, and the question of action and reaction again is very convoluted (as is the philosophy of Nietzsche in those respects). In a revelatory poem however, Nietzsche muses that the Eagle does not deadly attack the Sheep out of hunger (i.e. out of self-preservation). But BECAUSE HE HATES THE SHEEP. Nietzsche was of superhuman sensibility and kindness. But there also was great cruelty inside him. Without this pathology he likely would have actually been the greatest and most integral philosopher of all time.)
(Plato – who embraced irony and to whom we owe the description of Socrates` irony –, with his idea of the state run by virtuous and self-restrained philosophers, articulated nearly 2500 years ago in ancient Greece for some good reason, wasn´t, in this fashion, a liberal democrat either. But the basic motivation for the philosopher-run state was to avoid unnecessary cruelty against any of its citizens. Yet neither Plato nor Socrates were „ironists“ in the Rortian sense. They were „metaphysicians“ who boldly considered ethics and virtue, „ideas“ and „the Good“ as the highest „idea“, as ultimate truths, as something absolute. They came to this conclusion however by sucessfully ironically subverting the absolute validity of everything else. And Plato was clever and ironic enough to acknowledge that it is not (or cannot be) exhaustively clear what an „idea“ actually is and what „the Good“ actually is. He left it open. Plato, usually considered as the No. 1 philosopher, was an „ironist metaphysician“.)
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Both the „ironist“ and the „metaphysician“ are ideal types. Rorty (somehow) constructs them to play them off against each other (usually in favor of he former). Yet there also seem to finally be individual idiosyncrasies by Rorty in this game again. Rorty acknowledges to use the term „metaphysician“, in a sense of the term which I am adapting from Heidegger. In this sense, the metaphysician is someone who takes the question „What it the intrinsic nature of (something) at face value. He assumes that the presence of a term in his own final vocabulary ensures that it refers to something which has a real essence. The metaphysician is still attached to the common senseetc. (p.74) I cannot remember correctly if Heidegger defined (or would have defined) a „metaphysician“ like this. However Heidegger´s own philosophy and his metaphysical aim was to illuminate the secrets of Being. Yet to Heidegger to illuminate the secrets of Being not only required rational thinking and philosophy but, even more, some possibility of sentient experience. He was dismissive of rational rechnendem Denken and advocated a (hopefully) more integral besinnliches Denken (the (political) tragedy of Heidegger consisted in never being able to exactly figure out what the core of this besinnliches Denken and the „authenticity“ it should bring about actually should be – due to his lack of sentience).
At the same time, Heidegger was acutely aware that there might not be deep and profound, primordial – i.e. „metaphysical“ – truths lying hidden in Being. And that the history of philosophy – and the philosophical „quest for truth“ – is not necessarily an ascending path but contingent (he even considered it basically an error – a history of Seinsvergessenheit). To Heidegger, the human urge to metaphysics much rather stems out of the obvious absence of positive ultimate truths, out of man´s Hineingehaltenheit ins Nichts. Out of this nothingness, man, out of his metaphysical urge, basically would then construct some metaphysics that seems appropriate to him. I.e. Metaphysics, to Heidegger, rather seems a constructive, creative and „poetic“ undertaking than a discovery of fixed, ultimate truths – as it is to Rorty.
Throughout his life Rorty remained very fond of Heidegger (as well as of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein). All of them started to philosophise out of a distinct metaphysical urge but became dismissive and/or iconoclastic against „metaphysical“ notions of some absolute, ultimate truth being out there. Rather, they came to see metaphysics as an enterprise of „poetry“ (and were distinctly poetic in their highly vibrating writing styles). Also Rorty´s ironist thinks of final vocabularies as poetic achievements rather than as fruits of diligent inquiry according to antecedently formulated criteria. (p.77) – whereas the metaphysician does not redescribe but, rather, analyses the old descriptions with the help of other old descriptions. (p.74) To Rorty, the instrument for discovering (non-scientific) existential truths is not metaphysics and philosophy, but poetry (he even goes as far as considering science as some kind of poetry). He proclaims that literature (especially novels) is more useful for augmenting humanism and ethics than philosophy.
I am a poet and in contrast to Rorty I have written several novels. Yet also in contrast to Rorty I do not consider poetry that absolute or literature that intelligent (for instance I cannot quite understand how someone of the intelligence of Shakespeare spent his life writing dramas instead of ascending to philosophy at some point). Philosophy is more intelligent than literature because you need to work at a higher level of abstraction while you need to keep the details and idiosyncrasies in your mind as well. And you finally need to sort out things, you need to be precise. Heidegger, Nietzsche or Wittgenstein have not made profound contributions because they were poetic – a minor comedian is poetic as well – but because they were intelligent. Their charisma stems out stems out from them having been – from beginning to the end – metaphysicians (in a more broader term the Rorty´s (somehow polemical and pejorative) figure st he „metaphysician“) (as well as in the more narrower sense: Nietzsche came to completely unironically consider his concepts of Will to Power or of the Eternal Return the Same as absolute, metaphysical truths; Heidegger was stuck in his quest for authenticity (which requires something authentic to finally exist) and Wittgenstein in his peculiar intellectual radicality and his desire to make everything he did an ethical undertaking. Needless to say, Rorty also ends up as metaphyscian in his definitive attachment of the notion that there is no absolute truth – a truly metaphyscial position, since it is unprovable). Heidegger, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein longed for wisdom, not for poetry. (Maybe it is Rorty who actually longs more for poetry than for wisdom.)
Rorty´s notion of metaphysics and his concept of the metaphysician is somehow constructed. What he describes as metaphysics – a quest for ultimate and tangible truths, then to stick to them and impose respective codes of social conduct on others – rather resembles religion. Any true metaphysician is/should be aware that metaphysics by definition is beyond of what can intelligibly be reached. Metaphysical „truths“ per se are unprovable. Rorty somehow takes metaphysics as an ontological enterprise (aiming at revealing a true character st he objective, physical world). Yet metaphysics should actually be seen, with Heidegger, as an interpretation of man´s In-der-Welt-sein. Metaphysics necessarily involves the question about how much we finally can be able to grasp „ultimate“ truths beyond our immediate reach, i.e. it involves epistemology and the subjective element inherently. Apart from ontology and epistemology, metaphysics also involve deontology (the question what should be done, how conduct should be within the universe) and eschatology (the question st he „meaning“ and the telos of existence). However, this metaphysical „interpretation“ needs to have some plausibility, validity and intersubjectivity (otherwise it is mysticism). Therefore, metaphysics is an interpretation of something that cannot finally be explained by abstract conclusion of evidence, logics etc. that st h be found in this world (as zuhandenes Zeug, in a way). The metaphysician also redescribes, even though he does it in the name of reason rather than in the name of imagination. (p.90) Err, yes. Metaphysics is overly a rational enterprise, not „poetry“, although it also necessitates imagination (hence the „poetry“ in practically all metaphysics and metaphysician´s writings). Also Heidegger´s undertaking and notion of truth finally is meant st h revelatory (not poetic).
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The ironist spends her time worrying about the possibility that she has been initiated into the wrong tribe, taught to play the wrong language game. She worries that the process of socialization which turned her into a human being by giving her a language may have given her the wrong language, and so turned her into the wrong human being. But she cannot give a criterion of wrongness. (p.75)
Indeed, Rorty`s notion about contigency as something countercultural appears as such a contigency. In Eastern „vocabularies“, in Taoism or in Shintoism, the acceptance of contingency, impermanence and change seems to come much more natural than in the Occident. Also, there seems to be greater fatalism against violence and cruelty, which are seen as forces as old as the world itself. Nevertheless, the Eastern mentality does not strike me as very ironic. I might be in the wrong, but I have not noticed a lot of irony in the many cultural artefacts from Japan. Irony is subjectivity at ist peak, and in collectivist cultures there is less room for subjectivist peaks. It was probably the misfortune of these cultures that they were not „metaphysicist“ enough, but rather dreamy and „poetic“, without the metaphysician´s need for precision – that then translates into a truly scientific and philosophical worldview. They did not invent science or technology, and neither democracy nor individualism.
Nevertheless, these Eastern „vocabularies“ are (both on the superficial and the deep level) „metaphysics“. In Taoism, the contingencies in this world stem out from the Tao, in Shintoism they are the result of struggles between indestructible, transcendental forces in the cosmos. The practical and ethical zeal within these vocabularies is to align man to these cosmic forces and principles – in a pious, religious, non-ironic way. (At very sophisticated levels of piousness, e.g. in Sufism, you have some room for irony again, e.g. yelling at and scolding God for his frequent stupidities and cruelties he inflicts on us.)
Zen Buddhism is a method to come to terms with the transcendental (or transcendentally imposed) contingencies inflicted on us as well – respectively with the paradoxes and aporias of existence. The behaviour of the Zen Masters apears as profoundly ironic. Yet it is also profoundly that of a metaphysician (if you don´t give the correct answer to an essentially opaque koan, you get beaten). On the other hand, Zen Buddhism is neither ironic nor metaphysicianist. Zen Buddism tries to establish a meta-level to metaphysics and a meta-irony to irony. Zen Buddism tries to achieve what in Western metaphysics we would call transcendental subjectivity. With this transcendental subjectivity you should actually be able to understand the world, and yourself in it, as how it fundamentally is. The articulations of the Zen Masters are paradoxical and it seems difficult, if not impossible, to actually describe what they see. Yet actually it is easy. The Satori perception allows you to permanently switch between motif and background. And it actually is the essential structure of the world that motifs appear from/in a background and illuminate and reveal each other. Yet ordinary human perception either focuses on one or the other. The Satori perception directly gazes into the interplay of both. The interplay between background and motif is both contingent and ironic as well as it is fundamental. With the Satori perception you are both a meta-metaphysician and a meta-ironist. Mundane categories like „ironist“ and „metaphysician“ are of less concern to you.
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Irony at a very sophisticated level of piousness and religiousness you also have in Kierkegaard. Yet also only to some degree (actually to quite a little one, as Kierkegaard was a religious maniac). That is inherent, because „religion“ means the „careful observance of the laws and duties“, i.e. something staunchly metaphysical and something that Rorty abhorrs. Yet Kierkegaard likes irony. At the end of Either/Or you have an Ultimatum on The Upbuilding in the Thought that: against God we are always in the wrong. That seems to be the ultimate peak of irony. And I also like the idea that against God we are always in the wrong. I like the idea that there is an intellectually and ethically supreme instance against which we always remain in the wrong (though Kierkegaard means something different in his text). How ironic that against God we are always in the wrong! And how fundamental, and immune to any contingency, that against God we are always in the wrong!
In rational terms, this world, in ist superficiality and ist depth, evades us. We do not master past, present and future. We do not master Sein und Zeit. Ultimately (yet only: ultimately – in time we can achieve important successes) we are always in the wrong against those instances. Spiritualise this, and spiritualise yourself, and you have: against God you are always in the wrong. And this is cool. It is actually uplifting. That against a forever intellectually and morally supreme instance you are always in the wrong makes you feel safe – and it gives you a stable, fundamental, transcendental identity and place (i.e. something which, according to Rorty, cannot exist): you are the one/someone who against God is always in the wrong. And who affirms it. That is the final truth of (your) existence.
The final conclusion of Kierkegaard´s On the Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates is also an enigmatic ellipsis, stating that the highest elevation of subjectivity is not irony, but humor. On other occasions Kierkegaard states that the highest echelon man can achieve is to become „transparent in God“. What being „transparent in God“ actually means is, like everything else Kierkegaard says, difficult for the ordinary mind to understand (an improvement of understanding should come with time). Yet irony is somehow intransparent, obfuscating, confusing indeed. Irony frequently (even inherently) is a suboptimal tool in communication, since with irony you tend to confuse people. It may also be superficial. The ironist itself may just be confused. It is maybe an obfuscation of confusion and superficiality. (The „ironist“, to whom Rorty always refers to in the female form, may actually, in a flash, resemble a striking, fascinating „femme fatale“ woman that hypnotises with unconventional behaviour and elusive „now you see me, now you don´t“ attitude but who, however, becomes repetetive after a while.) Humor seems somehow more integral and comprehensive than irony, as well as something more positive. Humor accepts things and the humorist accepts herself, maybe in some way of happy half-resignation against cruel contigencies and iron laws (which, however, does not rule out subversion – since humor is affirmation and subversion alike). Humor erects some kind of (unexpected, constructive, revealing) mirror image on the subject of humor. Irony (somehow grudgingly) subverts, but humor equalises and alings subject and object.
Kierkegaard enigmatically concludes that humor is beyond the state of man – it is a divine state, the state of the Gottmensch. Again, without further elaborating on it. However, if you find Upbuilding in the Thought that: against God we are always in the wrong, you are most likely beyond a state of irony. You are, then, actually in some heavenly state of humor! You have ultimately approached the divine, as much as approaching the divine is possible. In a way, with you being always in the wrong against the divine, you humoristically mirror the divine – which, due to the paradoxes it necessarily contains, never completely is in the right, but is insufficient all alike. Maybe more insufficient than you, since it is the more perfect creature, i.e. minor insufficiencies may weight heavier in it than major insufficiencies in you, the more imperfect creature. That you are always in the wrong against the divine puts elementary shame on the divine in the first place. This relational humor likely is a metaphysical reflection of fundamental, transcendental truth. It reflects how creation actually is. Once it has been sorted out how creation actually is, metaphysics is not needed anymore. You both need irony and metaphysics to ascent to this place. Yet what will finally there be, and finally will remain, after metaphysics and irony have been overcome, is humor.
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Gigantic circles are spinning and are intertwined. Irony (reaction, subversion) and metaphysics (action, affirmation) arduously process themselves, react to each other, try to triumph over each other, try to realign, love each other, hate each other, out there in the transcendental place. This is how truth proceeds, this is at least how the story goes. Therefore the profound irony within my philosophical musings – as I am aware that I am doing experiments. The irony within my musings is that they are meant to be experimental. I think this is as closest to „truth“ as we can get. I try to erect plateaus over the abyss, and to improve and solidify them with time. Due to their experimental nature, my musings are only meant to 93 percent to be true, my plateaus to 93 percent to be solid. Another „irony“ in my musings is that they are not particularly academic in style (therefore academia being very cruel to me (now – but likely very kind to me in later times)) and that they are packed with (all sorts of) information. This is maybe less so out of intention not only to subvert but also to enrich academic philosophy but because this is natural to me. Everything I come across I sooner or later need to philosophise about, and all these things are dear to me, I am attached and attracted to them. My musings may go on the nerves because they are packed with information (and for other reasons). But this seems important to me because at any moment I could die. And I do not want to take many secrets to the grave. Truth has to be told. Constructiveness and bases for further developments need to be ensured. Most recently my musings often go on my own nerves already the following day. Since I am permently under impressions, a lot of what I write stems out from spontaneous impressions. And even the next day I may stand under other impressions and may ask myself what the hell I was thinking about then. Also my thinking rapidly evolves and some strategies and tactics I used may seem outdated to me quickly (yet, luckily, NOT the substance of what I was saying). Therefore, I (ironically) leave everything as it is. And I am actually quite happy to see that no fucking ChatGPT might imitate this kind of writing in a 100 years – ha! A very natural, unfiltered intelligence should triumph over an artificial intelligence, still. As I frequently state, I see no deeper – and actual – truth in the universe than its character as a chaosmos and I do not see a deeper philosophy possible than that of the Chaosmos. I might be in the wrong, and I´d like to see someone presenting me deeper and more accurate views than mine (as I like it to be in the wrong against an intellectually and morally superior instance). But I am not so positive about this possibility. Therefore my musings are actually not philosophical musings but eschatological and transcendental ones. And the irony in them is actually humor. – On this occasion I felt the urge to clarify on this. I do not want to take many secrets to the grave. Truth has to be told or clarified. Constructiveness and bases for further developments need to be ensured. There also will be another note about Richard Rorty and the challenges he poses, and for which I am grateful.
All quotes from Richard Rorty: Contingency, Irony, and Solidaridy, Cambridge 1989